A secret sharing scheme is a method of distributing a secret among a set of participants in a such way such that certain subset of participants are qualified to compute the secret by combining their shares. Shamir [1] used a polynomial f (x) = t−1 i=0 a i x i over finite field GF (q) to construct his scheme. In this paper we propose to construct a secret sharing scheme by using a more general polynomial than Chun [4] and Shamir used. Our proposed polynomial is of the form f (x) = t−1 i=0 a i (x i + x qi ) over a finite field GF (q). We use an algebraic approach to reconstruct the secret. Some problems related to solving the system of linear equations generated by pulling the shares are investigated.
Introduction
A secret sharing scheme is a system designed to share a piece of information or a secret among a group of people in such way that only authorized group of people can reconstruct the secret from their shares. Secret sharing was developed first in 1979 by Shamir [1] and Blakley [6] who presented two different methods to construct a threshold scheme. Shamir's method was based on Lagrange interpolating polynomial, while Blakley's was based on linear projective geometry. Secret sharing is used in many applications like bank vaults, distributed systems, and the control of nuclear weapons. For details, the reader is referred to [5] and [11] .
Many people proposed and studied a lot of contructions and applications of secret sharing schemes. Constructions from various matrices can be found in [7, 8] and [10] .
In Shamir's secret sharing scheme, a dealer and w participants P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P w are involved. The dealer chooses a finite field GF (q) and the secret s ∈ GF (q), where q is prime power and q ≥ w + 1. The dealer chooses randomly a polynomial f (x) of degree t − 1 with coefficients in GF (q), f (x) = s + t−1 j=1 a j x j .
Computing and distributing shares to the participants are as follows:
1. The dealer chooses w distinct non zero elements in GF (q), denoted by
2. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ w, the dealer computes
3. The dealer gives the share (x i , y i ) to participant P i for each i.
If there are t participants pooling their shares then they can recover the secret s, but if t − 1 or less participant polling their shares than they can not get any information about the secret. Such a scheme is called (t, w) − threshold scheme. Let's look at how a subset of t participants will reconstruct the secret. Suppose participant P i 1 , . . . , P it want to determine the secret s. They know that y i j = f (x i j ), 1 ≤ j ≤ t, 1 ≤ j ≤ t. The polynomial f (x) is the secret polynomial chosen by the dealer. Since f (x) has degree at most t − 1, f (x) can be writen as f (x) = a 0 + a 1 x + . . . + a t−1 x t−1 , where the coefficients a 0 , a 1 , . . . , a t−1 are unknown and a 0 = s. From the fact y i j = f (x i j ), the group of t participants can obtain t linear equations in the t unknowns a 0 , . . . , a t−1 as follows:
These t linear equations form a system of linear equations which can be writen in matrix forms as follows:
Since A is Vandermonde matrix its determinant is not zero, it follows that A is invertible. So the system of linear equations AX = Y has a unique solution.
It follows that the group of t participants can recover a 0 , a 1 , . . . , a t−1 .
What happens if a group of t − 1 participants attempt to compute s? They will obtain a system of t − 1 equations in t unknowns. Suppose they guess a value α for the secret, they will get the t th equation from knowing that the secret is a 0 = f (0). The coefficient matrix of the resulting system of t equations in t unknown will again be a Vandermonde matrix. So the system of equations has a unique solution. This means that every choice of value β of the secret, there is a unique polynomial f β (x) such that y i j = f β (x) for 1 ≤ j ≤ t − 1 and f β (0) = y. Hence every group of t − 1 participants can not have information about the secret.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces some preliminary notes. Section 3 presents a generalization of Shamir's scheme. Section 4 presents some remarks and open problems.
Preliminary Notes
In this section we present several result that we used to make a new element labeling in a finite field. The following properties can be found in [2, 3] and [9] Theorem 2.1 The set Z n is a fiinite field if and only if n is a prime. Theorem 2.5 For any prime p and any positive integer n there exists a unique field GF (p n ) of p n elements.
To construct a finite field GF (p n ) one can choose an irreducible monic polynomial f (x) ∈ Z p [x] of degree n over Z p . The next step is to form a
Example 2.6 Elements of finite field constructed from an irreducible monic polynomial f (x) = 1+x+x 2 over Z 2 can be written as GF (4) = {0, 1, x, 1+x}.
Theorem 2.7 A correspondence ϕ from GF (p n ) to a set G = {0, 1, 2, ..., p n − 1} with the rule ϕ(a 0 +a 1 x+...+a n−1 x n−1 ) = a 0 +a 1 p...+a n−1 p n−1 is a bijection mapping.
By defining new addition and multiplication operations on the above set G we can perform G as a finite field of p n elements. From the property of the uniqueness of finite field we can consider GF (p n ) = {0, 1, . . . , p n − 1}. can be presented as
and 2a 0 is considered as the secret. The dealer chooses w distinct elements x i ∈ GF (q). The condition is that w + 1 ≤ q. All x i are public information. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ w, the dealer compute y i = f (x i ), and gives y i as the share to P i . Thus each participant receives (x i , y i ).
If t participants joint together and combine their shares then there are t linear equations with variables a 0 , a 1 , a 2 , ..., a t−1 . The system of linear equations formed by all the t linear equations has the following form:
Setting s = 2a 0 , the above system ol linear equations can be presented as a matrix multiplication AX = Y , where
If the matrix A obtained from the above calculation is non singular then we can use Shamir's procedure to obtain a generalization of Shmair' secret sharing schemes. We have not yet proven analytically that the matrix A formed by the above system of linear equations is non singular. However we can give an example showing that there is a matrix of the form
has non zero determinant.
constructed from an irreducible monic polynomial g(x) = 2 + 2x + x 4 over Z 3 . After labeling on the elements of F we can rewrite the finite field F as F = {0, 1, 2, . . . , 80}. Suppose the dealer chooses a polynomial f (x) = 1 + x 2 + x 3 + x 5 + x 6 as the secret polynomial and gives shares to 7 participants x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 4 , x 5 , x 6 , x 7 each of which 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, then the matrix coefficient A obtained from the system of linear equations generated by the joining of the seven participants shares is given by: 
The determinant of the matrix A is det(A) = 15. All the computations are executed in the finite field F = GF (3 4 ) constructed above. Since the determinant of matrix A is not zero, the matrix A is invertible. Therefor the system AX = Y has a unique solution. In other word, we can construct a secret sharing scheme as Shamir did with more general polynomial as described above.
Concluding remarks and open problems
Introducing more general polynomial f (x) = t−1 i=0 a i (x i + x iq ) as the polynomial secret in Shamir's scheme we obtain a scheme that is not simple to brake the secret. To compute the secret we have to do computation in a finite field. We use a new labeling method in the elements of the finite field, and then redefine new addition and multiplication operation. The resulting finite field is a set with its elements are labeled from a set of non negative integers. The computation is then based on the new labeling field. In fact, there is another method in arithmetic computing in this scheme, that is, by finding a primitive elements of the field and then express each its elements as a power of a primitive element. There are still some open problems from the resulting scheme, for example, whether the resulting scheme is ideal or not, determination of the access structure, and the scheme is threshold or not.
